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The origins of this article arose from previous research into the 
connections between the disciplines of economics and thermody-
namics, begun more than a quarter of a century ago, culminating in 
a paper published in 1982
1, which was subsequently followed up 
by a presentation to an international symposium, hosted by the 
Hungarian government, concerning East-West approaches to the 
energy problem. Since that time the boundaries of knowledge have 
expanded, and in 2007 a more advanced paper was published
2. 
 
The last decade has seen the emergence of concern and debate 
about climate change and the impact of greenhouse gases on world 
ecological and economic systems, much arising from the burning 
of carbon-based fuels. Comprehensive research has been carried 
out by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
There has been some revival of interest, though now more cau-
tious, in the views propounded by the Club of Rome and ‘Limits to 
Growth’ three decades ago. 
 
Economic systems, particularly of developed countries, have be-
come progressively embedded in an energy base, to provide a 
source of productive power and human wealth. Economics and 
energy are seen as being very much related to one another. This 
was the thesis of the original 1982 paper, though as a thermody-
namic analogy of the workings of economic systems, rather than 
the use per se of energy in an economy. Whereas a simple conven-
tional economic production system might be set out as: 
 
[capital K, labour L, resources B] = Output (G)  
1.  Bryant J. (1982) ‘A  Thermodynamic Approach to Economics’, Energy Economics, Vol 4, No.1, pp. 36-50. 
2.  Bryant J. (2007) ‘A Thermodynamic Theory of Economics’ International Journal of Exergy’ Vol 4, No. 3, pp. 302-337. 
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with no special regard for system limits, other than those of the 
business/trade cycle, investment for the future and acceptable sup-
ply and demand variations; under a thermo-economic system due 
regard has to be taken of the impact of any restrictions, including 
waste/residue (D) and other relevant factors. 
 
Moreover, the system incorporates Le Chatelier feedback mecha-
nisms to increase or decrease the forward path, according to the 
impact of any key factor, with a two-way arrow to signify that the 
reaction can speed up, slow down, or even stop.  In addition, a 
restriction affecting one business, market or economy can affect 
another, via their interlinking requirements. Thus the format for 
output G might be modified as follows, with values a, b, c, x and y 
representing the proportions of each factor in the process: 
Development 
Until comparatively recently, much account of the impact of re-
source and waste factors has not seriously had to be taken, except 
at the micro-economic level. Oil, gas, minerals, water, land, food 
and agricultural factors have all been found to feed the human 
economic system. For example, in 1980 world gas reserves stood 
at about 85 trillion m
3  (source: BP) representing 58 years at current 
production. In 2006, the comparable figures were 181  trillion m
3  
and 63 years respectively. Figure 1 opposite shows that virtually 
up to the present time major economies have been able to advance 
long-term, relatively unscathed by outside factors. GDP per capita 
for the older developed countries, such as USA, Germany, Italy 
and UK has inexorably advanced against a relatively constant level 
of GDP/capital stock – bar business/trade cycle effects. In the case 
of Japan and Spain, after initial high growth and investment, GDP 
growth slowed and the curves then shifted to the left. Outside the 
West, other economies have joined this process, such as China, 
South Korea, Taiwan and some East European and Middle Eastern 
countries. With the aid of economics and technology, humankind 
is progressively, and ever more efficiently, consuming resources of 
the world, in many cases without replacing/recycling much of 
them. It is fair to say, however, that some countries, such as Ger-
many, have and are installing increasingly more comprehensive 
recycling measures to offset this trend. 
 
Population 
Associated with the benefits of economic growth has been a in-
crease in population. It is a matter of opinion as to whether popula-
tion size may be approaching a ceiling within a finite world. There 
are indications that feedback in the system, perhaps along the lines 
described above, has reduced birth rates in some areas of the 
world. Between 1980 and 2004, population growth in East and 
West Europe has been only 10%. However, growth elsewhere has 
been larger—North America 34%, Asia & Oceania 44%, Central 
& South America 52%, Africa 85% and the Middle East 93%. In 
China, measures to control family size are now in place, though 
the total population is still projected to rise for some while yet. 
The US Census Bureau projects a world population level of 9bn by 
2042, 36% more than at present. 
Source: OECD, Penn World 
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Energy 
Energy consumption has played a major role in the development of 
the world economy, having grown nearly threefold between 1965 
and 2006 to 10.9 billion tonnes per annum oil equivalent. Figure 3 
illustrates the development of primary energy consumption per 
capita and GDP (PPP) per capita for the four-decade period from 
1965—2004 for key economies, with the cross-reference of energy 
intensity. The picture is one of economies at different stages of 
development from emerging-industrial through to post-industrial. 
 
At the left had side, China is currently going through a significant 
industrial phase, with India further behind. Chinese per capita 
GDP and energy consumption, both low, are rising fast, but with 
energy intensity, after an initial high level, coming down to about 
0.2 kg oil equivalent per $ of output. Further along the develop-
ment path are Brazil and Mexico, followed by South Korea, with 
energy intensity still about 0.2 kg/$, but with energy consumption 
per capita much higher, in the region of 2-4 tonnes oil equivalent 
per annum.   The lines for Spain, Italy and Japan illustrate a further 
phase, where energy intensity begins to fall, having passed the 
main industrial phase, with  energy consumption per capita begin-
ning to level off.  
Source: BP, Penn World 
Source: CIA, BP 
 
The lines for France, Germany and UK illustrate the final phase, 
where energy demand per capita has flattened off at about 4 tonnes 
oil equivalent per annum, and with energy intensity in the region 
of 0.15 kg/$ and falling. 
 
Outside this envelope of curves are USA, Canada, Australia and  
Russia. US energy consumption per capita is twice European and 
Japanese levels, but energy intensity has fallen by half over the 
period to a little above 0.2kg oe/$. Canadian per capita energy 
consumption is even higher. Australian energy consumption per 
capita continues to rise, although energy intensity has remained 
steady from 1980 onwards at about 0.3 kg oe/$. Last, the Russian 
economy has both high energy intensity and high per capita energy 
consumption. With the recovery of the Russian economy since 
1996, energy intensity has begun to fall. 
  Table 1.  GDP PPP   Population  Energy Consumption    
    2006  2007  2006   
    bn $ pa.  %  mn  %  mn toe pa.  %   
 USA  13130  19.9  301.1  4.6  2326.4  21.4   
 China  10170  15.4  1321.9  20.0  1697.8  15.6   
 Japan  4218  6.4  127.4  1.9  520.3  4.8   
 India  4156  6.3  1129.9  17.1  423.2  3.9   
 Germany  2630  4.0  82.4  1.2  328.5  3.0   
 UK  1930  2.9  60.8  0.9  226.6  2.1   
 France  1891  2.9  63.7  1.0  262.6  2.4   
 Italy  1756  2.7  58.1  0.9  182.2  1.7   
 Russia  1746  2.6  141.4  2.1  704.9  6.5   
 Brazil  1655  2.5  190.0  2.9  206.5  1.9   
 Korea (South)  1196  1.8  49.0  0.7  225.8  2.1   
 Canada  1178  1.8  33.4  0.5  322.3  3.0   
 Mexico  1149  1.7  108.7  1.6  154.2  1.4   
 Spain  1109  1.7  40.4  0.6  145.8  1.3   
 Australia  675  1.0  20.4  0.3  120.8  1.1   
 Rest World  17361  26.3  2873.6  43.5  3030.6  27.9   
  World  65950  100.0  6602.2  100.0  10878.5  100.0   
                 
Source: UN, Penn World 






















Figure 3. Primary Energy Consumption per capita (toe/hd pa.) versus GDP per capita pa. 
1965 - 2004
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The  studies carried out by the IPCC, Stern Review and UKCIP02 
all point to the necessity to reduce or contain the impact of green-
house gases on the world climate and atmospheric temperature, 
though there continues to be some debate on the probable out-
come. The scenarios painted by the agencies do, however, illus-
trate a point of this paper, that restrictions placed on economic 
systems can potentially affect their forward path in quite a dra-
matic way; and the impact of the analyses presented to a world 
audience may enact feedback to construct policies to change the 
shape of the future. Approximately 55% of world CO2 emissions 
increases arise from fossil fuel use, the rest from deforestation, 
agriculture and other areas (IPCC SPM 1). Figure 4 shows how 
emissions from consumption and flaring of fossil fuels have varied 
in relation to primary energy consumption for key countries and 
the world: 
Sources: EIA, BP 
 
Although emissions from fossil use have been rising, in many 
cases their ratio to energy consumption has declined. The French 
ratio in particular has shown a marked drop, partly arising from the 
high level of nuclear input into electricity generation. Ratios for 
Australia and Japan are rising. Clearly if all countries emulated 
France by introducing a large nuclear programme, or developed 
other technologies, such as renewable and wind power, carbon 
sequestration and vehicle drive technology, then there is much 
room for improvement in the world emissions ratio. However, 
over the 24-year period to 2004, the world ratio has declined by 
only 5%, and it is a matter of confidence, probability, and the re-
sults of national efforts as to how much further the  ratio will actu-
ally decline in future decades.  
 
The same will apply to projections of energy intensity, the trend of 
which is displayed at figure 3 for a 39-year period. From the chart, 
on the basis of the trends, it is conceivable that for many European 
countries a figure near to 0.1 kg oe / $ or lower might be attain-
able, particularly if past the industrial phase. For developing coun-
tries this may be more difficult. The Chinese figure in 2004 is 
about the same as it was in 1998. In the 34-year period between 
1970 and 2004, the US was able to halve energy intensity to 0.22 
kg oe / $, with a continuing trend downwards. Australia, Canada 
and Russia, however, appear to have much further to go, though 
local conditions should be taken into account. 
3.   Helm D. ‘The New Energy Paradigm’ (2007). Oxford University Press. 
After Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, and prior to the studies of 
IPCC, nuclear technology had lost some of its shine, taking into 
account the potential for future terrorism, nuclear accidents and 
having to bear the full cost of storing some waste perhaps for 
many generations. A number of countries had enacted policy barri-
ers to nuclear new build or to close plants before the end of their 
economic lifetimes
3. The recent earthquake in Japan has sent fur-
ther alarm bells ringing. It is possible that some countries may 
return to nuclear technology in the future.  
 
There are of course many other technologies to explore, including 
renewable, wind and solar power, and sequestration to remove 
CO2 emissions (also involving burial underground or at sea, with 
further environmental concerns). Reduction in transport emissions, 
may depend partly on switching to electric power. Reforestation 
also offers the opportunity to take up CO2 emissions. All of these 
technologies are likely to add significantly to the cost of providing 
energy, and subtract from possible GDP growth. Both IPCC and 
Stern make calculations as to the cost as a percent of GDP of pro-
grammes to reduce the effect of emissions on the climate. Ecologi-
cal economics is fast becoming a major tool in shaping future pro-
gress, with the need to account for full waste/resource costs in any 
development.  
IPCC and Stern indicate that CO2 emissions must come down 
significantly over the future. The Stern report for example indi-
cates that to stabilise at 550ppm by 2050, emissions would need by 
then  to have been reduced to about a quarter of current levels. 
IPCC project that emissions of developed countries should fall 
40%-95% below 1990 levels for a low to medium CO2 stabiliza-
tion level.  
 
Table 2 sets out some illustrative positions (not taken from IPCC or 
other source), based on fossil fuel emissions only,  for emissions at 
47% of those in 1990. Assumptions are displayed in red. Any num-
ber of combinations and sizes of reduction are possible, but to be 
meaningful they have to be consistent with what observers believe 
nations can achieve against trends achieved so far. The writer de-
fers to the experts at IPCC, Stern and others on the probabilities of 
any scenario. 
                   
  Table 2. Example projections of World Energy Consumption & GDP   
      2000  Projection 2050   
  Assumption      A  B  C  D  E   
                   
  Population  bn  6.08  9.0  9.0  9.0  9.0  8.0   
  Emissions CO2  #  GtCO2 pa.  23.85  10.0  10.0  10.0  10.0  10.0   
  Energy Consumption   bn toe pa.  9.31  5.0  6.7  10.0  10.0  10.0   
  Emissions/Energy  tCO2/toe  2.56  2.0  1.5  1.0  1.0  1.0   
  Energy per capita  toe pa.  1.53  0.56  0.74  1.11  1.11  1.33   
  Energy Intensity Kg/$  KG/$  0.19  0.15  0.10  0.10  0.05  0.05   
  GDP PPP (2000)  $ trn  $48.6  $33.3  $66.7  $100.0  $200.0  $200.0   
  GDP per capita  $ 000  $8.0  $3.7  $7.4  $11.1  $22.2  $25.0   
  Growth GDP/Hd 2000 - 2050    -1.5%  -0.2%  0.7%  2.0%  2.3%   
  (1980 - 2000 = 2.58% pa.)               
                   
  Assumed figures in red         Source 2000 data:   BP, EIA   
   # Emissions arising from fossil fuel use only.  
On the assumptions given, all the illustrations indicate lower than 
historic growth in GDP per capita, with some going negative. To 
achieve scenario D, the emissions/energy consumption ratio is 
pitched at 39% of that in 2000 (compared to the small 5% drop 
achieved from 1980 to 2004 illustrated at figure 4), and energy intensity 
at 0.05 kg oe/$ is nearly a quarter of 2000 levels (well outside the 
range of the 39-year history illustrated at figure 3). Scenario E shows 
the effect of a reduction in population size. The alternative to the 
scenarios, is to accept a higher level of global warming than im-
plied by a low to medium stabilization level.  
Figure 4. Ratio CO2 Emissions from consumption & flaring of 
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Economic  
The studies of IPCC and Stern indicate that to reduce net carbon 
emissions requires a significant investment in technology. A part 
of this expenditure will be to replace ageing plant, but much of the 
rest serves not to increase or replace capacity, but to increase the 
net cost of producing cleaner and more efficient energy. What 
otherwise could have been channelled into consumption of other 
goods and services, raising GDP per capita, may now have to be 
channelled into ’safeguarding’ expenditure. The economic poten-
tial of these technologies is set against a carbon price, at which it 
becomes profitable to invest in them.  
 
A product of this process, however, will be to bend the curve of 
GDP/capital stock, illustrated at figure 1 of this paper, to the left, 
with growth in GDP per capita slowing down, against a net capital 
stock per capita still rising because of the increased cost of capital 
output. It is intuitively obvious that economic growth will likely 
slow down, until economies have been weaned off their use of 
carbon based fuels onto other technologies. We may thus enter a 
world of lower growth and reduced consumption, which poten-
tially could be quite long-lasting.  
International 
The effect on the world economy may depend partly on agree-
ments as to how much each country agrees to reduce their emis-
sions. Table 3 summarises CO2 output from consumption and flar-
ing of fossil fuels in 2004. 169 countries ratified the Kyoto proto-
col, which runs to 2012. Notable exceptions included USA and 
Australia. India and China, although signed up, are not required to 
reduce carbon emissions. Currently, UK, Sweden, Germany, 
France and Netherlands appear to be on target to achieve their 
reduction
 (EEA). Canada has abandoned its Kyoto target of a 6% 
reduction on 1990 levels; in 2004 its emissions were 30% above 
those of 1990. In June 2007 G8 leaders agreed to aim at least to 
reduce global CO2 emissions by 2050. While it takes not too much 
effort to make a joint declaration, it is less likely that individual 
governments, mindful of their electorate and the short term conse-
quences to their economy and sectional business interests, will 
move swiftly to enforce draconian policies that could seriously cut 
GDP. Some governments may choose to ignore the situation and 
carry on doing ‘business as usual’.  This may of course worsen the 
longer-term situation, and eventually antagonise others, politically 
and economically. 
             
  Table 3. CO2 output from consumption and flaring of fossil fuels 2004   
    Population                CO2 Output       CO2 per capita 
    mn  mn tonnes pa.  %  tonnes pa.   
  USA  293.0  5912.2  21.9  20.18   
  China  1298.9  4707.3  17.4  3.64   
  Russia  144.0  1684.8  6.2  11.70   
  Japan  127.3  1262.1  4.7  9.91   
  India  1065.1  1112.8  4.1  1.04   
  Germany  82.4  862.2  3.2  10.46   
  Canada  32.5  588.0  2.2  18.09   
  UK  60.3  579.7  2.1  9.62   
  South Korea  48.4  496.8  1.8  10.26   
  Italy  58.1  485.0  1.8  8.35   
  France  60.5  405.7  1.5  6.71   
  Australia  19.9  386.2  1.4  19.39   
  Mexico  105.0  385.5  1.4  3.67   
  Spain  40.3  361.9  1.3  8.98   
  Brazil  184.1  336.7  1.2  1.83   
  Rest of World  2752.9  7476.7  27.6  2.72   
              
  World  6372.7  27043.6  100.0  4.24   
             
       Source: EIA    
Tavistock House 
10 Falconers Field 
Harpenden AL5 3ES 
United Kingdom 
Tel:             +44 1582 462015 
Fax:             +44 1582 767459 
E-mail:  john.bryant@vocat.co.uk 
Web:                www.vocat.co.uk 
 INTERNATIONAL  LTD   VOCAT 
Director:                                John Bryant BSc MSc CEng FIMechE FEWI 
 
Consultancy, Research and 
Expert Witness Services 
A study carried out by the  IFPR 
4 on the world water and food 
position to 2025 indicates that the world is facing severe water 
scarcity, with severe impacts on food production, health, nutrition 
and the environment. The FAO 
5 indicates that humanity faces a 
challenge on how to ensure sustainable use of fisheries resources 
when the level of demand has increased beyond what aquatic envi-
ronments are able to supply, and appears set to continue. The UN 
6 
reports that by 2008 more than half the world’s population (3.3bn) 
will be living in urban areas, and by 2030 this is expected to swell 
to 5bn. Many of the new urbanites will be poor. 
 
Knowing our limits 
All the forgoing analysis shows that in predicting the future, poli-
cymakers, managers and economists are increasingly having to 
take account of the impact of resource and waste factors on the 
world. Releasing unlimited CO2 into the atmosphere is no longer 
an option, in terms of temperature rise and potential loss of land.  
Over-fishing the world’s seas for food on behalf of a growing 
world population could be short-sighted. A part of the problem is 
the escalating size of the world population itself. Though overall 
this is now growing at a lower rate, for some countries, with large 
and densely-populated areas, future growth will present policy-
makers with  a difficult situation to deal with. 
 
Over the  next few decades humankind may have to get used to a 
low or nil growth GDP scenario, placing a limit on consumption 
and what this may mean in terms of the distribution of world 




The longer term requirement is for a cut in world emissions per-
haps to less than half of 1990 levels, made worse by a forecast 
increase in world population to 2050 of up to 50%. It is of course 
for world governments to agree on a target, and what is equitable 
for each country, given their individual circumstances and state of 
development. Such agreed targets, however, would not be feasible 
unless strategies to reduce both emissions/energy consumption and 
energy intensity were viable (see figure 3 and figure 4).  
4. World water and food position to 2025 International Food Policy Research Institute 2002. 
5. Sustainability Issues, Fisheries and Acquaculture Department, UN Food & Agriculture Organisation. 
6. State of the World Population 2007 UN Population Fund. 
Other Areas 
Much interest and effort has been focussed on the implications for 
the world economy on climate change, and the need to reduce   
emissions of greenhouse gases to stabilize temperature rise. There 
are, however, other areas of concern for the future.  